August 24th 1942, 2pages with pencil additions in the margin
"Mr Harrod's Paper: Foreign Lending, Industrialization and the Clearing Union
"1. I feel very much in sympathy with Harrod's main point about the Clearing Union mechanism, viz: that credit Countries should be allowed to go on accumulating credits (which will be necessary for them if they are 'surplus savings' countries), that sanctions should be applied only to those debit countries which are piling up debits more rapidly than the average and that a distinction should be drawn between the excess debit countries which are improvident and those which are impecunious
"2. I also agree very heartily indeed with his proposition that nothing should be done to encourage investment of capital overseas in ways which will make it most easy to expand the exports of the borrowing country to pay for the investment....
"3...we are justified...in insisting that no undeveloped counties should be encouraged to industrialise uneconomically...simply because this may make it easier for them to export, and and thus to restore their balance of trade, incidentally improving their terms of trade..."
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September 8th 1942, typed memorandum 12pages folio with corrections and insertions in red ink and blue pencil. This memorandum is different to Harrod's draft of August 1942 described above and contains an appendix on pages 11-12 "Definition of 'excess debit' countries"
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(August 28th 1942). Copy No.128, printed on green paper, 12pp, folio The printed version which was given to Morgenthau in Washington as an idea for examination and not as a proposal from the Goverrment.
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November 9th 1942. Copy No.163, printed on green paper, 14pp, folio. The revised version.
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October 7th 1942, 1 page from Treasury Chambers. "Thanks for your two letters of September 23 and 24. I would have acknowledged them before now if my mind had not been entirely on other matters. "I believe that the idea is that you should come round one day to the Treasury for a discussion with us on the various matters involved. So I will say no more until I see you then. In fact, I have not very much to add to what you already know about my view of tactics "
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